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Geoffrey MG's Beyond Wallacia

Wallacia denotes the overlapping of Asian and Australian bio-geographical areas. This ensures an interesting mix of species.

Thursday, November 01, 2001

Best PR strategy for the US may be a 'come-clean'

First posted at Krisis Onine

When I read Susan Sach?s article U.S. Appears to Be Losing Public Relations War So Far (propaganda, New York Times, 28 October), I thought "no wonder". The US administration?s belated effort to win over Muslim public opinion to its military response to 11 September is dogged by one critical issue: the country?s own involvement in unleashing the extremist forces that terrorised the people of Afghanistan for a decade and, more recently, the United States itself.

According to the United States and its media, September 11 has no substantial past except for the crazed actions of Usama bin Laden and his band of Al Qaida brigands who, with the evil Taliban, suddenly sprang from the murky killing fields of a region swarming with religious fanatics.

The Muslim public knows, however, that bin Laden did not just appear "out of the blue" to attack the United States. They know who funded the training camps for hundreds of thousands of non-Afghanis who participated in the war against the Soviet occupation. They know some went home to cause trouble, others stayed. They know that the USA's long-time South Asian ally, Pakistan, has meddled in Afghanistan affairs for 20 years, promoted the most extremist of groups and, with US approval, managed the Taliban during its formative years. They know of the recent US and Pakistan hostility to the 'Northern Alliance'.

They know, they distrust and they fear. Hardly an appreciative audience for American explanations of good intent and even handedness.

Crisis communications is a critical factor in crisis management and its first maxim is coming clean. "Arrogance or indifference leads to predictable errors," public relations professional, James E. Lukaszewski, wrote in Good News About Bad News.

"Because public feedback quickly intensifies for reasons managers fail to understand," he explained, certain behaviors cause the first problems in emergencies, among them:

Obfuscation is the failure - deliberately or foolishly - to recognize that when time and understanding are critical, simplicity is a must. The perception is of dishonesty and insensitivity.

Prevarication is perhaps the greatest error.

There's no substitute for the absolute truth.

Pontification is dangerous.

Revelation is inevitable. If a company is guilty, that fact will be revealed ... and the disclosure is deserved.
"Each of these behaviors generates unnecessary negative perceptions in the audiences most affected by the emergency. Audience response to these perceptions is inevitable," Lukaszewski wrote.

They are amongst the lessons learnt well by US companies, large and small, but not yet by the US government.
|| Geoffrey, 5:42 AM || link || (0) comments | links to this post

Defusing Terrorism at the original 'Ground Zero'

It is refreshing to review James Phillips masterful, Defusing Terrorism at Ground Zero: Why a New US Policy is Needed for Afghanistan, published as a Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation) on 12 July 2000. Fourteen months before '9/11 he wrote directly to the point, with a title thsat is eerily familiar:

"When the United States helped the Afghan resistance defeat the Soviet Army in a brutal guerrilla war, it scored one of its biggest Cold War victories. However, shortly after Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States withdrew from active involvement in Afghan affairs. As a result, Washington squandered the residual influence that it had acquired through its $3 billion aid program for the Afghan resistance in the 1980s ..."

He described the aftermath of the Soviet occupation as a "humanitarian disaster" with two million dead, the world's largest refugee population, a limping economy, shattered infrastructure and a traumatized civil society.

"In the critical period following the 1992 collapse of the Afghan communist regime," he wrote, failure of the US to play a constructive role "weakened and demoralized moderate Afghan groups and allowed Pakistan to help create and support the radical Taliban movement [which] now dominates Afghanistan both politically and militarily and provides support to a wide spectrum of radical Islamic groups, including Osama bin Laden's terrorist network."

It was bin Laden's August 1998 bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that moved Afghanistan "off the back burner of US foreign policy," he wrote.

However, Clinton?s following hunt for Usama bin Laden, he argued, failed to grasp the extent to which he is "a lethal byproduct of the revolutionary upheaval in Afghanistan. The war-torn country has become the incubator for a malignant mixture of contagious viruses - Islamic radicalism, terrorism, and drug smuggling - that have spread to Afghanistan's neighbors and throughout the Muslim world."

He warned that the United States needed to "develop a coherent long-term policy for building an Afghanistan that is stable and peaceful and that no longer serves as a safe haven for international terrorists, drug smugglers and Islamic revolutionaries."


On Pakistani and other interference

- The Islamic rebellion sparked by the April 1978 communist coup in Kabul mushroomed into a broad-based war of national resistance following the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

- "Because Afghan nationalism was a threat to Pakistani interests, Pakistan encouraged the Afghan resistance to organize along Islamic rather than nationalist principles ... an Islamic Afghan regime installed in Kabul with Pakistani help would be a natural ally to help Pakistan block Soviet expansion and give Pakistan strategic depth with respect to arch-rival India."

- Pakistan also sought to forestall the formation of a unified Afghan resistance movement that could operate independently. "Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, which controlled the flow of supplies to Pakistani-based mujahideen, funneled aid to seven rival resistance groups in order to divide the mujahideen and keep them as dependent on Pakistan as possible. Mohammed Yousef, former Director of the ISI, revealed that the ISI channeled more than 70 percent of American and Saudi aid to extremist mujahideen groups."

- Following the April 1992 collapse of Afghan President Najibullah's communist dictatorship, a loose coalition of resistance groups took power in Kabul, founded the Islamic State of Afghanistan and selected Sibgatullah Mojadidi, the leader of one of the smallest mujahideen groups, as first president.

- The unity dissolved into warring factions when the new government was opposed by Pakistani-backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

- "The ruthless leader of one of the largest and most radical mujahideen groups, the Party of Islam, Hekmatyar was a virulently anti-Western revolutionary who was determined to seize absolute power. Arab Islamic radicals, Libya, and Pakistan gave him the lion's share of the foreign arms supplied to the mujahideen."

- Hekmatyar's forces besieged Kabul from 1992 to 1996, bombarding the city with artillery and rockets that killed thousands of civilians. "Periodically he launched offensives against the city in league with a shifting constellation of other anti-government groups, such as the Unity Party, an Iranian-backed umbrella coalition of Shia Muslim groups."


On Rabbani and Massoud

- The backbone of the provisional government was Burhannudin Rabbani's Islamic Society, "a moderate Islamist party predominantly composed of ethnic Tajiks from northern Afghanistan." Rabbani replaced Mojadidi as president in June 1992 and refused to relinquish the rotating presidency in December 1994 as scheduled, because of escalating fighting.

- Rabbani's chief lieutenant, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was the most effective mujahideen commander to emerge from the war against the Soviets. A "pragmatic and popular Tajik political leader as well as an astute military strategist," became the Minister of Defense and the linchpin of the provisional government.

- In January 1994, after Massoud's forces blocked Hekmatyar's campaign to storm Kabul and whittled away his military forces, the Uzbek militia defected from the provisional government. The militia's leader, General Abdul Rashid Dostam, whose defection had helped seal the fate of the Najibullah regime, then fought Massoud's forces to a standstill for two years. "The rise of the Taliban forced both to put aside their differences and join forces in the Northern Alliance in October 1996."


On the Taliban

- The Taliban first emerged in early 1994 in the Pushtun tribal areas of southern Afghanistan. Their Islamic vigilantism was widely applauded by Pushtun tribesmen but they "also benefited from extensive Pakistani logistical and military support. Pakistan's Interior Ministry mobilized thousands of young Pushtun students from religious schools and transported them to the front.

- These eager zealots, many of whom grew up in teeming refugee camps in Pakistan, were indoctrinated in the strict fundamentalist Deobandi school of Islam. Many of their schools were little more than 'jihad factories' that prepared impressionable young men for continuous warfare. The Taliban's revolutionary ardor and rural roots made them 'an Afghan version of the Khmer Rouge.'"

- "Washington initially misjudged the depth of anti-Western hostility within the Taliban and perceived it as a possible ally against Iran. The State Department was overly optimistic that the Taliban's rule would bring stability to Afghanistan and underestimated the threat it posed to regional stability. It urged other nations to ?engage? the Taliban in hopes of moderating its radical policies.

- "Washington's attitude toward the Taliban also was affected by hopes that a stabilized Afghanistan could provide a transit route for oil and gas produced in Central Asia. This would have contributed to the economic development of post-Soviet Central Asia. It also would have preempted a possible pipeline through Iran and reduced Russian leverage over Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, both of which were seeking outlets for their surplus energy resources.

- "The Clinton Administration supported plans for two pipelines, projected to cost $2 billion each, to transport oil and gas from Turkmenistan through western Afghanistan to Pakistan, where the oil would be routed to an export terminal in Karachi."

- "Julie Sirrs, an Afghanistan expert who recently visited northern Afghanistan, confirms that the Taliban appears to rely heavily on foreign support, given the large number of Taliban prisoners of war that Massoud has captured who were originally from Pakistan, China, and Yemen ... The Taliban's heavy dependence on foreigners, particularly Pakistanis, is resented by many Afghans, who distrust foreign influence and complain about a creeping Pakistani invasion."


On bin Laden and Al Qaida

- Since 1996, Afghanistan has been "ground zero for an international terrorist network controlled" by Usama bin Laden, the heart of which is his Al Qaida umbrella group. His first anti-US terrorist attack was a December 1992 bombing of a hotel in Yemen used by American soldiers en route to humanitarian operations in Somalia.

- "In February 1998, he announced the formation of the 'International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders' and signed a fatwa calling on all Muslims 'to kill the Americans and their allies - civilian and military.'"

- "For the past two years, the primary goal of Washington's Afghanistan policy has been to bring Osama bin Laden to justice. The United States has pressed the Taliban repeatedly to seize or expel him. The Taliban regime, however, maintains that bin Laden is an honored guest who is not guilty of terrorism and cannot be handed over to kafirs."

Despite growing diplomatic and economic pressures, the Taliban regime has refused to cooperate. "The reasons for this defiance - which ultimately could threaten the Taliban's hold on power - lie in the nature of the Taliban and the Afghan political scene."


James Phillips' recommendations for a new US policy:

Maximize international pressure on the Taliban to halt its support of terrorism (Push for UN Security Council total trade and arms embargo against Taliban zones. This would also make it more difficult to export drugs under the cover of legal goods).

Pressure Pakistan to end its support for the Taliban (threaten a tilt to India, exploit Pakistan's disastrous economic situation, convince Pakistan that the Taliban will become an increasing drain on its limited economic resources, as well as a long-term foreign policy liability).

Provide military, diplomatic and economic support to the Taliban opposition (cooperate with Russia, Turkey and Central Asian neighbors to support any Afghan group opposing terrorism. But financial and extensive military aid should be channeled through Commander Massoud's effective organization within the Northern Alliance to strengthen coordination and to prevent corruption).

Forge a regional coalition to support anti-Taliban opposition and an Afghan peace settlement (The conflict is a transnational one, not a purely internal conflict as ethnic and religious groups straddle the borders. Strengthen resistance to the Taliban and encourage emergence of a more moderate Pushtun leadership. USA, Russia and the six neighbors should negotiate a treaty similar to the 1955 State Treaty that set the rules for Austrian neutrality. US should work closely with Pakistani allies China and Saudi Arabia to convince Pakistan of the benefits of dropping th Taliban).

Build an internal Afghan consensus for peace (promote an inclusive political dialogue between representatives of the factions and all ethnic, religious, and political groups and assist the gathering of a loya Jirga).

Designate the Taliban as a terrorist organization (empower US financial institutions to freeze Taliban assets, block fund-raising activities inside the US and deny visas to Taliban officials. Will set the stage for declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism if it stubbornly continues to support the Taliban).

Provide humanitarian aid (US provides about $80 million/year in humanitarian aid through the UN. Shift most to a bilateral cross-border aid program to help counter the perception that the US abandoned the Afghan people. Base the aid program in Tajikistan rather than Pakistan).

Allow the Northern Alliance to reopen the Afghan embassy. (US should recognize the Northern Alliance again as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and allow its ambassador to reopen Afghanistan's embassy in Washington).

Revive bipartisan congressional activism on Afghanistan (US Congress played a critical role in shaping policy toward Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. Congress often prompted the Reagan Administration to increase its efforts to support the Afghan resistance

This is a blueprint for success.
|| Geoffrey, 5:22 AM || link || (0) comments | links to this post

The US State Department covert pro-Taliban policy

First posted at Krisis Online

Comment: Watching the US cable services following '9/11' I happened across a House of Representatives? International Relations Committee session with Secretary of State Powell. I was impressed with one member who politely insisted on disclosure of state department records dealing with Afghanistan. He said he had been denied the documents by former secretary Madeline Fulbright. He received an equally negative response from Powell. I later learned the Congressman is Dana Rohrabacher of California. The following is testimony he submitted to the Senate?s Foreign Relations Subcommittee on South Asia on April 14, 1999:


Mr Chairman:

Thank you for allowing me to testify this morning. This hearing is especially significant, because beyond the important matters of human rights violations, especially against women, terrorism and drug proliferation, what transpires in Afghanistan today will have a profound impact on the entire region of Central Asia for years to come.

I have been involved with Afghanistan since the early 1980s when I worked in the White House as a speech writer and special assistant to President Ronald Reagan.

In 1988, immediately after I was elected to Congress I traveled into Afghanistan with mujahideen fighters and participated in the battle of Jalalabhad against the Soviets. At that time I learned first hand of the courage and generosity of the Afghan people.

I also learned from the Afghans that I traveled with and the villagers that housed me that the average Afghan is not a fanatic or an religious extremist, but to the contrary, very hospitable and generous, by the very essence of their traditional culture. What has happened during the past few years under Taliban rule is a tragic perversion of Afghan culture and religious heritage.

Having been closely involved in US policy toward Afghanistan for some twenty years, I have called into question whether or not this administration has a covert policy that has empowered the Taliban and enabled this brutal movement to hold on to power. Even though the President and the Secretary of State have voiced their disgust at the brutal policies of the Taliban, especially their repression of women, the actual implementation of U.S. policy has repeatedly had the opposite effect. I base this claim on the following reasons:

· In 1996, the Taliban first emerged as a mysterious force that swept out of so-called religious schools in Pakistan to a blitzkrieg type of conquest of most of Afghanistan against some very seasoned former-mujahideen fighters. As a so-called "student militia," the Taliban could not have succeeded without the support, organization and logistics of military professionals, who would not have been faculty in religious schools.

· The US has a very close relationship with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, in matters concerning Afghanistan, but unfortunately, instead of providing leadership, we are letting them lead our policy. This began during the Afghan war against the Soviets. I witnessed this in the White House when U.S. officials in charge of the military aid program to the mujahideen permitted a large percentage of our assistance to be channeled to the most anti-western non-democratic elements of the mujahideen, such as Golbodin Hekmatayar. This was done to placate the Pakistan ISI military intelligence.

· In 1997, responding to the pleas of the Afghan-American community and the recognized Afghanistan ambassador, I led an effort to stop the State Department from permitting the Afghanistan embassy in Washington from being taken under the control of a diplomat loyal to the Taliban. Instead, of permitting a new ambassador who was assigned by the non-Taliban Afghan government that is still recognized at the United Nations, the State Department claimed "we don't take sides," and forced the embassy to be closed against the will of the Afghanistan United Nations office.

· During late 1997 and early 1998, while the Taliban imposed a blockade on more than two million people of the Hazara ethnic group in central Afghanistan, putting tens of thousands at risk of starving to death or perishing from a lack of medicine during the harsh winter months, the State Department undercut my efforts to send in two plane loads of medicines by the Americares and the Knightsbridge relief agencies. State Department representatives made false statements that the humanitarian crisis was exaggerated and there was already sufficient medical supplies in the blockaded area. When the relief teams risked their lives to go into the area with the medicines - without the support of the State Department they found the hospitals and clinics did not have even aspirins or bandages, no generators for heat in sub-zero weather, a serious lack of blankets and scant amounts of food. The State Department, in effect, was assisting the Taliban's inhuman blockade intended to starve out communities that opposed their dictates.

· Perhaps the most glaring evidence of this administration's tacit support of the was the effort made during a Spring 1998 visit to Afghanistan by Mr. Indefurth and U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson. These administration representatives convinced the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance not to go on the offensive against a then-weakened and vulnerable Taliban. And instead convinced these anti-Taliban leaders to accept a cease-fire that was proposed by Pakistan. The cease fire lasted only as long as it took the Paks to resupply and reorganize the Taliban. In fact, within a few months of announcement of the U.S.-backed "Ulema" process, the Taliban, freshly supplied by the ISI and flush with drug money, went on a major offensive and destroyed the Northern Alliance. This was either incompetence on the part of the State Department and U.S. intelligence agencies or indicative of the real policy of our government to ensure a Taliban victory.

· Can anyone believe that with the Taliban, identified by the United Nations and the DEA as one of the two largest producers of opium in the world, that they weren't being closely monitored by our intelligence services, who would have seen every move of the military build up that the Pakistanis and Taliban were undertaking. In addition, at the same time the U.S. was planning its strike against the terrorist camps of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. How could our intelligence services not have known that Osama bin Laden's forces had moved north to lead the Taliban offensive, where horrendous brutality took place.

· In addition, there has been no major effort to end the flow of opium out of Afghanistan, which is the main source of the revenues that enables the Taliban to maintain control of the country, even though the US Government observes by satellite where the opium is grown.

I am making the claim that there is and has been and is a covert policy by this administration to support the Taliban movement's control of Afghanistan. It is my guess, that this amoral or immoral policy is based on the assumption that the Taliban would bring stability to Afghanistan and permit the building of oil pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan to Pakistan.

We have a choice between believing that this administration's policy toward Afghanistan has been incompetent beyond belief, or is directed toward achieving a covert purpose.

I believe the administration has maintained this covert goal and kept the Congress in the dark about its policy of supporting the Taliban, the most anti-Western, anti-female, anti-human rights regime in the world. It doesn't take a genius to understand that this policy would outrage the American people, especially America's women.

Perhaps the most glaring evidence of our government's covert policy to favor the Taliban is that the administration is currently engaged in a major effort to obstruct the Congress from determining the details behind this policy.

Last year in August, after several unofficial requests were made of State Department, I made an official request for all diplomatic documents concerning US policy toward the Taliban, especially those cables and documents from our embassies in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. As a senior Member of the House International Relations Committee I have oversight responsibility in this area.

In November, after months of stonewalling, the Secretary of State herself promised before the International Relations Committee that the documents would be forthcoming. She reconfirmed that promise in February when she testified before our Committee on the State Department budget. The Chairman of the Committee, Ben Gilman, added his voice to the record in support of my document request. To this time, we have received nothing.

There can only be two explanations. Either the State Department is totally incompetent, or there is an ongoing cover-up of State Department's true fundamental policy toward Afghanistan. You probably didn't expect me to praise the State Department at the end of this scathing testimony. But I will.

I don't think the State Department is incompetent. They should be held responsible for their policies and the American people should know, through documented proof, what they are doing.


Update: The original transcript is no longer available on the internet.
|| Geoffrey, 5:12 AM || link || (0) comments | links to this post